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It is generally accepted that video surveillance system operators 
lose their concentration after a short period of time and may 
miss important events taking place. In addition, many 
surveillance systems are frequently left unattended. Because of 
these reasons, automated analysis of the live video feed and 
automatic detection of suspicious activity have recently gained 
importance. To prevent capture of their images, criminals resort 
to several techniques such as deliberately obscuring the camera 
view, covering the lens with a foreign object, spraying or de-
focusing the camera lens. In this paper, we propose some 
computationally efficient wavelet domain methods for rapid 
camera tamper detection and identify some real-life problems 
and propose solutions to these.  
 
1. Introduction 
With the usage of digital video recording systems for video 
surveillance, real-time automated analysis of the captured video 
footages has also gained importance. However, the literature 
lacks information about the detection of cases in which the 
camera is tampered with to make the captured video images 
useless. Camera tampering methods include obscuring the 
camera view, covering the camera lens with a foreign object, 
spraying of the camera lens with paint or de-focusing. Although 
methods and systems for detection of fog and reduced visibility 
for road applications have been available for a while [1,2], 
solutions specific to surveillance systems have not appeared in 
the literature and information about such systems are not 
publicly available [3,4], hence it is not possible to evaluate the 
performances of these systems. 
In this paper, two new algorithms are proposed to detect 
obscured camera view and reduced visibility. Both algorithms 
are based on a learned background model, which is used as a 
base image together with its wavelet transform. The algorithms 
proposed in this paper are intended for real-time operation on up 
to 16 cameras at a time. Therefore computational complexity is 
of extreme importance.  Background subtraction and detection of 
suspicious activity is carried out in the wavelet domain for 
computational efficiency. 
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In Section 2 we review the background subtraction method to 
obtain a background image of the monitored scene. Then in 
Section 3, we propose a method of detecting obscured camera 
view. In Section 4 we present an algorithm to detect the reduced 
visibility case. Following this, we propose some enhancements 
to the algorithms to increase the system robustness and to reduce 
false alarm rate in Section 5. Overall system is described in 
Section 6, experimental results are presented in Section 7 and 
concluding remarks in Section 8.  
2. Background subtraction method 
As deliberate tampering of a camera modifies the background of 
the monitored scene permanently, estimated background images 
are used for camera temper detection to reduce the number of 
false alarms by detecting deviations from the normal 
background.    
Background subtraction is commonly used for segmenting 
out objects of interest in a scene [5]. There are a number of well-
established methods in the literature [6-10]. The background 
estimation algorithm described in [6] uses a simple IIR filter 
applied to each pixel independently to update the background 
and uses adaptively updated thresholds to classify pixels into 
foreground and background. This is followed by some post 
processing to correct classification errors.  
The background can be defined as temporally stationary part 
of the video and hence stationary pixels in the video represent 
the background scene. If the scene is observed for some time, 
then the pixels forming the entire background scene can be 
estimated because moving regions and objects temporarily 
occupy only some parts of the scene in a typical image of a 
video. A simple approach to estimate the background is to 
calculate the average of the observed frames of the video. Since 
moving objects and regions occupy only a part of the image, 
they conceal a part of the background scene and their effect is 
cancelled over time. In Video Surveillance and Monitoring 
(VSAM) Project at Carnegie Mellon University [7] a 
computationally efficient method based on recursive background 
estimation method was proposed. In this paper, we use this 
method to get an estimate of the background image, but other 
methods described in [6-10] can be also used without loss of 
generality. 
Let In(x,y) represent the intensity (brightness) value at pixel 
position (x,y) in the nth frame. Estimated background intensity 
value at the same pixel position, Bn+1(x,y) is calculated as 
follows: 
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where Bn(x,y) is the previous estimate of the background 
intensity value at the same pixel position. Initially, B0(x,y) is set 
to the first image frame I0(x,y). The update parameter a is a 
positive real number where 0<a<1. A pixel positioned at (x,y) is 
assumed to be moving if the brightness values corresponding to 
it in image frame In and image frame In-1 satisfy the following 
inequality:  
1( , ) ( , ) ( , )n n nI x y I x y T x y−− >  (2) 
where In-1(x,y) is the brightness value at pixel position (x,y) in the 
(n-1)st frame In-1, Tn(x,y) is a threshold describing a statistically 
significant brightness change at pixel position (x,y). This 
threshold is recursively updated for each pixel as follows: 
1
( , ) (1 )( | ( , ) - ( , )|)
( , ) ,if ( , ) is non-moving




aT x y a c I x y B x y
T x y x y








where c>1 and 0<a<1. Initial threshold values are set to an 
empirically determined value. As can be seen from (3), the 
higher the parameter c, higher the threshold or lower the 
sensitivity of detection scheme.  
The Wavelet Transform (WT) of the background scene can 
be estimated from the wavelet coefficients of past image frames. 
When there is no moving object in the scene, the wavelet 
transform of the background image is stationary as well. On the 
other hand, foreground objects and their wavelet coefficients 
change in time.  Therefore Equations (1)-(3) can be also 
implemented in the wavelet domain to estimate the wavelet 
transform of the background image as described in [5]: 
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where W jBn(k,l) represent the (k,l)-th coefficient of the wavelet 
image or some  low-low image in the j-th scale of the WT. 
Thresholds used to determine if W jIn values have changed or not 
are adaptively updated as in (3). When the viewing range of the 
camera is observed for a while, then the WT of the entire 
background can be estimated because moving regions and 
objects occupy only some parts of the scene in a typical image of 
a video and they disappear over time. Non-stationary wavelet 
coefficients over time correspond to the foreground of the scene 
and they contain motion information.  
In the proposed camera tamper detection algorithms, W jBn is 
used as ground truth of how WT of normal camera view should 
look like and any deviation from this is calculated to detect the 
obscured camera view and reduction of visibility.  
3. Detection of obscured camera view 
(OCV) 
When a camera view is obscured by an object or sprayed with 
paint, it is expected that the histogram of In is skewed towards 
the lower end of the grey scale. The proposed algorithm first 
calculates the histograms of In and Bn. Then the maximum values 
of the histograms are compared to check if In has a higher peak 
than Bn and if In  has a higher peak then histogram of the 
absolute difference |In- Bn| is checked to see if it is skewed 
towards the black values. For an obscured camera view, it is 
expected that this difference image has higher values near the 
black end.  
The above comparisons can be also carried out in low-low 
subimages of the wavelet transform. This, in fact, increases the 
robustness of the overall scheme because small changes in the 
scene are smoothed out by the low-pass filter of the WT.   
 
Let Hi(.) be the 32-bin histogram of an image where iȯZ+ and 
1≤i≤32 and max(Hi(.)) is the maximum value in the histogram. A 
camera view is said to be obscured if both (5) and (6) hold: 
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where Th1>1 and Th2>1 are thresholds which can be increased 
for higher sensitivity. 
4. Detection of reduced visibility (RV) 
The aim of this module is to detect reduced visibility in the 
conditions like fog, smoke or camera lens getting out-of-focus. 
The characteristic of reduced visibility condition is the absence 
of small scale detail over a large region of the image which 
implies diminished high frequency energy. Wavelet transform 
provides a convenient means of calculating high frequency 
energy because edges in the original image produce high 
amplitude wavelet coefficients and extrema in the wavelet 
domain [11]. Comparison of the amount of detail could be done 
by comparing the energy of wavelet detail coefficients. A 
significant loss of details and edges in the current image In 
compared to the background Bn implies reduced visibility. This 
can be conveniently measured in the wavelet domain. Let 
LH nW I , HL nW I  and HH nW I  represent the horizontal, 
vertical and diagonal detail subbands of a single stage wavelet 
transform of In respectively. Then high frequency energy of In is 
estimated by 
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Similarly for Bn: 
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We reach the conclusion that there is reduction in visibility if; 
3( ) ( )HF n HF nE I Th E B<  (9) 
where 0<Th3<1 is a variable threshold which can be changed 
according to the desired sensitivity. Sensitivity is higher when 
Th3 is closer to 1. 
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5. Measures against false alarms 
In real-life operation, some other conditions should also be used 
to increase the system robustness and to reduce the false alarm 
rate. In this section such conditions are described. 
5.1. Persistency Check (PC) 
A characteristic of a deliberate action to make images captured 
by a camera useless is the persistency of the condition. Hence, to 
reduce the false alarm rate and increase the system reliability, 
persistency of the alarm condition over a number of images 
could be checked. Persistency check reduces the false alarm rate 
by eliminating the alarms caused by conditions such as an object 
passing by momentarily covering the camera view. An alarm is 
triggered if the conditions described in Section 3 and 4 are 
satisfied by three consecutive time instants, In-2, In-1 and In. 
5.2 Edge Correspondence Check (ECC) 
Edge correspondence check is used to confirm that a camera still 
is or is not monitoring the same scene. This emerges from the 
proposition that, if a camera is viewing the same scene, the 
location of the edges in Bn, which holds the long term scene 
information, and In, which is the current image should match. If 
the camera view is obscured, visible scene would be different. 
On the contrary, in the case of detection of reduction of 
visibility, camera would still look towards the same scene. Edge 
correspondence could be checked by looking at the number of 
matching edge pixels: 
Edge map of LH subband could be found by hard-
thresholding in wavelet domain detail data: 
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Edge maps for HL and HH subbands and the corresponding 
edge maps in In are found in a similar manner. Then, the number 
of corresponding edge pixels are calculated as follows: 
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If the camera view is obscured, then the edges are not 
expected to relate. On the other hand, desired condition for 
reduction is visibility is positive, confirming that the camera is 
viewing toward the same scene. 
5Matching TotalF Th F>  (13) 
where 0< Th5<1. 
5.3. Low Light Conditions (LLC) 
In real-life operation of surveillance systems, the amount of 
ambient light in the surroundings of a camera is not always 
sufficient. When it gets dark, the total energy of the image gets 
low and the noise starts to become dominant. This could lead to 
unreliable results in detection of reduction in visibility as noise 
fluctuating over a low DC value could mislead the system and 
generate false alarms. To prevent this, a fail-safe condition could 
be defined when the total energy is below a threshold: 
6( )HF nE B Th<  (14) 
where Th6 is the lowest energy limit below which detection is 
found to be unsatisfactory. 
       
       
       
       
Figure 1: Several frames of test sequences. First row has normal 
(left) and obscured camera image (right). Second row has 
normal (left) and reduced visibility image (right). The other two 
rows include frames from false alarm cases, showing low light 
cases in the third row and malfunction in the camera (left) and 





A 16-input video processing system is designed [12] which feeds 
the compressed video data in motion wavelet format [13] to our 
system. The data compression chip described in [13] uses 
Daubechies’ 9/7 biorthogonal wavelets. Proposed algorithms are 
run on all 16 cameras in real-time. Detected incidences are 
recorded in system log with the detailed event type. Audible and 
visible alarms are also triggered on detection. An advanced 
option of the system is that, even the camera on which tampering 
was detected is not permanently recording, images prior to the 
event could be committed to the disk. This is achieved by a 
circular buffer of historical images kept in memory. 
In real-life operation, due to differences in requirements and 
the environment, different levels of system sensitivity is 
required. This sensitivity can be incorporated with the thresholds 
used by the proposed algorithms. In order to determine these 
thresholds, system is run in normal conditions. For each 
threshold, related calculations are performed and thresholds are 
selected accordingly.  Furthermore, user selected sensitivity is 
added to the system to control the thresholds in individual 
algorithms. This allows the user to fine-tune the system for 
specific needs. 
7. Experimental results 
In the experiments, the sensitivity setting is used as the default 
value of 50 (from a range of [1-100] where 100 is the most 
sensitive). In this setting, thresholds are calculated as follows: 
Th1 = 1.4, Th2 = 1.4, Th3 = 0.75, Th4 = 0.5, Th5 = 0.5, Th6 = 0.1 
Persistency check duration is set to 500 miliseconds. We have 
tested with several clips with various lengths for alarm and non-
Alarm cases. Some of the frames from test sequences are shown 
in Figure 1.  
For true alarm cases, a 4.5 minutes long sequence is used for 
OCV and a 2 minutes long sequence is used for RV. For false 
alarms, 6 hours of video is used with several false alarm 
conditions (low light, malfunction in camera, sudden light 
changes, slow light changes, camera shake) and several normal 
conditions (slow/fast/small/large objects passing through the 
scene). The results are summarized in Table 1 & 2. It should be 
noted that, changing the thresholds for increased sensitivity also 
results in increased false alarm rates and vice versa.  
Table 1: True Alarm test results showing number of true alarms 
as well as detection delay with and without false alarm checks. 
In the video sequences there are 20 true OCV alarms and  9 RV 
alarms respectively. 
Without Any  
False Alarm Checks 
With All  










OCV 20/20 16.2 20/20 19,2 
RV 9/9 0.33 8/9 1.38 
 
Table 2: The table compares the number of false alarm cases 
when none of the false alarm checks are activated against when 
false alarm checks are activated one by one and when all checks 
are enabled. 










OCV 135/135 38/135 62/135 N/A 13/135 
RV 158/158 68/158 120/158 147/158 36/158 
As can be seen from these tables, adding checks to the system 
does not change the detected true alarm rate for OCV, where all 
the alarm conditions are detected correctly. Adding checks 
results in one missed true alarm case (out of nine alarms) for RV. 
In both cases it results in an increase in detection delay. Most of 
the delay is caused by the persistency check and can be 
controlled by the persistency check duration. While increasing 
the detection delay, these checks significantly reduce the number 
of false alarms as shown in Table 2. Considering the use cases of 
the system, such an increase to the detection delay is acceptable 
in favour of significantly reduced false alarm rate.  
The test videos used have been designed to simulate extreme 
conditions including very low light conditions where the noise 
becomes dominant and camera malfunction as illustrated in 
Figure 1. In normal operating conditions, the false alarm rates 
are much lower as long as necessary precautions are taken to 
eliminate such cases (such as using infrared cameras at low light 
conditions or replacing malfunctioning cameras).  
8. Conclusions 
In this paper we introduced two methods, first one detects the 
obscured camera view and the second is used for detecting 
reduced visibility. It is also shown that the false alarm rates are 
reduced further by persistency and edge correspondence checks.  
A fail-safe condition for low-light conditions is also used. 
Experimental results confirm the detection performance. 
References 
 
[1] Aanderaa Instruments Mira Visibility Sensor 3544 , URL: 
http://www.aanderaa.com/render.asp?ID=141&closeBelow=141
&segment=46&session= 
[2] C. Busch, E. Debes, “Wavelet transform for analyzing fog 
visibility”, IEEE Intelligent Systems and Their Applications, vol. 
13, no. 6, pp. 66-71, Nov/Dec 1998. 
[3] Vigilant Technologies, camera tampering detection, 
http://www.adyoron.com/site/item.php?ln=en&item_id=129&ma
in_id=60  
[4] 3VR Security, camera tamper, http://www.3vr.com/ 
[5] B.U. Töreyin, A.E. Çetin, A. Aksay, M.B. Akhan, “Moving 
Object Detection in Wavelet Compressed Video”, Signal 
Processing:Image Communication, EURASIP, vol. 20, pp. 255-
26 (2005). 
[6] M. Bagci, Y. Yardimci, A.E. Cetin, “Moving object detection 
using adaptive subband decomposition and fractional lower 
order statistics in video sequences”, Signal Process., pp. 1941–
1947, Dec. 2002. 
561
[7] R.T. Collins, A.J. Lipton, T. Kanade, H. Fujiyoshi, D. 
Duggins, Y. Tsin, D. Tolliver, N. Enomoto, O. Hasegawa, P. 
Burt, L. Wixson, “A system for video surveillance and 
monitoring: VSAM final report”, Technical Report CMURI-TR-
00-12, Carnegie Mellon University, May 1998. 
[8] G.L. Foresti, P. Mahonen, C.S. Regazzoni, Multimedia 
Video-Based Surveillance Systems: Requirements, Issues and 
Solutions, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2000. 
[9] I. Haritaoglu, D. Harwood, L. Davis, “W4: who, when, 
where, what: a real time system for detecting and tracking 
people, in: Third Face and Gesture Recognition Conference”, 
pp.222–227., April 1998. 
[10] J.C. Huang, W.S. Hsieh, “Wavelet-based moving object 
Segmentation”, Electron.Lett., 39 (19), Sept. 2003. 
[11] A. E. Cetin and Rashid Ansari, “Signal recovery from 
wavelet transform maxima”, IEEE Trans. Image Processing, 
1994 
[12] Visioprime Ltd., 30 St. Johns Road, St. Johns, Woking, 
Surrey, GU21 7SA, URL: www.visioprime.com. 
[13] Aware Inc., 40 Middlesex Turnpike, Bedford, 
Massachusetts, 01730, URL:www.aware.com, MotionWavelets 
real-time software video codec, 1999. 
562
